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Abstract
The total number of firms, out of which around at least 95 to 99 per cent (or even more)
are SMEs approximates the degree of competition that exists in each country and within
each sector of a national economy. A historical examination of the American and
Japanese firm evolutions, which shows a divergence in industrial organisation between
the companies in the USA and Japan provides a qualitative evidence to this role of
competition. Also, the same historical trip reveals the close relationship, which prevails
between the degree of competition as represented by the total number of firms and the
speed of economic growth. The cross section regression model developed in this paper
quantitatively confirms this relationship. Furthermore, it is suggested that the historical
divergence between the American and Japanese firm evolutions is due to some precise
factors such as relative abundance of resources, and other historical circumstances.
Consequently, there is not a unique path of optimum growth, since what is good for the
USA might not be good for Japan and vice versa. For instance, for the USA, the ‘big
business’ type has always prevailed during the last 120 years, whereas for Japan, the
smaller focal type of firms together with some huge conglomerates dominated the
Japanese economy. The cross country regression model not only confirms the importance
of organisational differences but also supports the endogenous type of economic growth.
Key words: firms, evolution, economic growth, endogenous, competition, resources,
history, Chandler, Fruin, organisation, integration, big business, focal firms, SMEs,
economies of scope, sub-contracting, diversification, decentralisation of decisions,
multidivision, oligopolies, regression, developed countries, zaibatsu, keiretsu.
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Introduction
The total number of firms in a national economy includes the large enterprises (LEs),
very often vertically integrated and multi-divisional, the medium and the small firms (the
latter two are often named SMEs). Researchers such as Chandler (eg 1977, 1990) and
Schumpeter (eg 1950) have extensively analysed the positive role the LEs historically
have played in the economic growth of nations like the USA and Germany and of
industries like the oil and chemical ones.
More recently, much interest has been shown in the role SMEs have been playing in
shaping national economies (one of the latest books on this issue is edited by Acs et al,
1999). This renewed interest is mainly due to the fact that in many countries, small firms
play an increasing role in economic growth, from the 1980s onwards (see, for instance D.
Storey, 1994). In this paper, an attempt will be made to synthesise the importance of all
types of firms under the umbrella of the total number of firms in an economy, in
explaining differences in economic growth amongst the most developed nations today.
This total number includes SMEs in a relatively proportionate way (about 99%, see for
example the International Note published by the JSBM, 1995, or the 1996 OECD report),
which means that any conclusions on the total number of firms will also be applicable to
the number of SMEs.
At the same time, reference will be made to competition. One of the characteristics of
strongly competitive markets is the large number of producers and hence their inability to
influence the prevailing prices. This characteristic will be utilised in this report to bring
evidence to my contention that stronger competition entails stronger economic growth on
both the macro and micro levels. Similar findings have been recently reached by various
researchers (see for example, Caree and Thurik (1998), Nickel (1996), also Pratten
(1991) ). In addition, the comparison of the historical evolutions of the Japanese and the
American firm will be used as evidence that in countries in which stronger competition
exists grow faster than others in which the oligopolistic and monopolistic elements are
more prevalent.
In the process of explaining the differences in economic growth amongst the most
developed nations today, elements of organisational innovations will be included. These
elements are necessary to include in this analysis because economic growth is not just
growth in investment and technological change. This will become more apparent in
sections A and B below. Economic growth will be further examined in section C and will
be tested econometrically in section D.
More precisely, sections A and B will deal with a historical examination of the firm
evolution in Japan and the USA respectively. Without such a trip to the past, it is
impossible to properly evaluate the present form, structure, quality and quantity of firms
in these two countries. In section C, the comparison between the two evolutions will be
examined and conclusions will be drawn. In section D an econometric model will give
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evidence to the previous sections and more relevant conclusions will be evaluated.
Finally, in section E a summary of some major conclusions will be separately developed.
A The Japanese firm evolution.
a-Japanese economies of scope and decentralisation of decisions
Several scholars have produced a detailed historical evolution of the Japanese economy
as well as of the Japanese firm (for a recent work on the small firms in this country see
Whittaker (1997)). In this report, I will synthesise the relevant parts of W. M. Fruin’ s
(1992) Chandlerian historical analysis of Japan’s spectacular economic development.
This author distinguishes three types of enterprises which have made their presence felt,
namely the zaibatsu, the independent urban firms, and the independent rural firms. Most
of the studies have been concentrated on the first type, and admittedly the most
prominent, in shaping the Japanese industries in a decisive way.
The privatisation process which took place in the second stage of the Meiji Restoration,
after 1885, was not smooth, leading to the particular nature that the zaibatsu  acquired
during that period. Indeed, these groups were from that starting point a collection of
mostly unrelated commercial, industrial, and service enterprises which were family-
owned and for a while family-managed. To use a modern term, they became
conglomerates and they had to find a way to create inter-dependence between
themselves.
Consequently, for this type of enterprises, from this early period, we had a situation of
joint production and distribution, thus generating economies of scope. As Fruin (1992)
remarked “…In Japan, zaibatsu grew for the most part by unrelated diversification, which
is to say that economies of scale in production and distribution were not the forces behind
the development of national or zaibatsu business groupings…” (p. 90). Unrelated
diversification was a salient feature of these groupings before the 1930s. The initial
clusters were transportation, mainly in shipping, energy production, and finance.
Manufacturing was crafted on to these initial activities. The extent to which the
interrelated constellation of firms was effectively coordinated, it generated and
contributed to the lowering of costs. For example, this coordination was obvious where
raw materials had to be sourced overseas, paid for and insured, shipped to Japan, stored,
shipped again, processed, and then distributed, thus making the non-manufacturing
segment of the value chain quite extended. Furthermore, when some economies of scale
were also realised, they were so in intermediate product markets.
Economies of scale did not take place until the boom of the World War I (WW1), and in
a more extensive way until the late 1950s. “...In Japan before World War II (WW2),
indeed before the late 1950s, the domestic and proximate East Asian markets for volume
goods were not large, and it was extremely risky to compete on the basis of economies of
scale in most instances…” (Fruin, 1992, p. 113).  Some sustainable scale economies were
present before WW1 only in some industries, such as textiles, paper, some metals
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production, food (sugar, beer, milled grains), beverages, some chemicals, and cement.
However, only textiles were exported in bulk, thus realising more economies of scale.
A significant corollary of the importance of economies of scope present in this early
Japanese industrial development, is the “…nearly universal separation of production and
distribution…” (Fruin, 1992, p. 109). Thus, countless specialised trading companies
existed at the same time as some bigger general trading firms which were part of the
largest zaibatsu.
The parallel existence of these two phenomena, namely, first, the divorce between
distribution and production, and second, the economies of scope had another
consequence, that is the inexistence of organisational centralisation and hence Japanese
firms of this period had a non-complex (weak) U-form organisational chart. The Japanese
holding companies concentrated managerial resources in factories and at the lower level
of the firm, and consequently they did not act as a capital market to allocate funds to
subsidiary enterprises. Even the most managerially advanced companies, the textile ones,
kept a relatively simple form.
Although zaibatsu firms played a central role in the Japanese economic development, the
independent enterprises were more numerous, widespread, and diversified in terms of
their activities. “…They were also more important given their estimated two-thirds (2/3)
to three-quarters (¾) contribution to the nation’s domestic manufactured product…”
(Fruin, 1992, p. 119).
Thus, without the natural resources of many Western nations, Japan was going to further
reinforce its existing strategy of creating this unique organisational system of its own.
One main message comes again and again, when analysing Fruin’s detailed study (1992,
eg chapter 5). That is, Japanese firms did not grow very large compared with Western
companies, they specialised their production in mainly one or two products at the most,
and they concentrated their organisational activities within the factories, thus avoiding
centralisation and accentuating inter-firm networks. The product focussed inter-firm
networks are translated in large out-sourcing as a percentage of manufacturing value
added. Consequently, vertical integration was low and a large network of product based
firms was already in place in Japan during the inter-war period.
Furthermore, often horizontal integration, through mergers and acquisitions, especially in
textiles, paper, agricultural chemicals, and machinery led to concentration of resources at
production sites and decentralisation. This also meant a gradual multi-functional
organisation of business starting with a single function such as sales or purchasing or
production and then gradually combining them in a parallel way. Thus the tendency to
specialise in form and function led to interdependence of firms at the same time.
b-Focal factories and sub-contracting
Decentralisation of management decisions amounted to the development to what Fruin
calls the focal factories which
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“…duplicated locally the growing complexity in managerial functions found at
the apex of the corporate hierarchy. Within focal factories, a panoply of corporate
functions could be found: quality-assurance offices, marketing and sales staff,
research facilities, and even personnel departments. Factory managers, like
company presidents, were enveloped by a hive of clerical and technical
specialists…Focal factories were charged not only with labour management but
also with technology transfer, product and process innovation, engineering,
manufacturing, cost accounting, new personnel policies, regional distribution, and
sales coordination…” (ibid, p. 136).
Why has this focal factories system evolved so strongly in Japan? Several reasons can be
detected from Fruin’s analysis. First, there was from the end of the 19th century a process
of a trial-and-error adaptation of Western knowledge and technology, which found a
fecund area for development in small decentralised local and autonomous firms. The time
and economic uncertainty constraints made this process even more necessary in such
firms. Second, the economic downturn following WW1 and defence cuts caused
widespread lay-offs among military arsenals and civilian shipbuilders. This large pool of
skilled and semi-skilled underemployed or unemployed workers became the pool of
many small subcontractors who became suppliers to large firms between the mid 1920s
and the beginning of the 1930s. Third, and as corollary of the second reason, larger firms
used the smaller subcontractors- also- because of their lower wages.
Fourth, factories were not producing for the national market but for regional or
international markets. Fifth, cost accounting methods were not well developed. Sixth, the
well-established regional traders and middlemen prevented companies from centralising
and coordinating relevant functions. This was especially true in the textile, cement, food,
and beverages, which considered together, accounted for 53% of the 200 largest
industrial firms in 1930. Seventh, there was no anti-trust legislation to prohibit
interlocking business alliances and hence small local firms could exist independently and
yet be at the same time part of a bigger group such as the zaibatsu.
Eighth, alliances in manufacturing and distribution of small focal firms minimised risks
while taking advantage of the production and distribution resources that other firms
commanded. “…a strategy of maximising inter-firm economies of scope through group-
driven cooperative transactions made better sense than the pursuit of internal production
and allocative efficiencies through vertical integration and product diversification…”
(Fruin, 1992, p. 157). Ninth, the performance of focal factories being strongly correlated
with the existence and intensity of inter-firm networks, suggests that there were
substantial savings in transaction costs and diseconomies of managerial control. Tenth,
the price-cost margins of small firms were also due to pursuing the strategy of producing
in distinct niches and thus offering dynamic complementarity (D. B. Audretsch et al,
1999).
Besides Fruin,  M. Best (1990) tells us a similar story:
“…When the Japanese firms first penetrate foreign markets they often find that
they are competing against firms with an array of product lines,. But instead of
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competing with a similar array, the Japanese competitor focuses on the high
volume segment and establishes a production facility that minimises complexity.
This strategy is based upon the fact that manufacturing overheads in Western
companies are usually between 150% and 250 % of direct labour costs…”
(p.142).
Hence, by focussing on a small number of product lines, Japanese greatly reduced costs
and consequently they were able to substantially undercut prices (see also J. C. Abegglen
& G. Stalk Jr.,1985).
There were, however, some alternatives to this system. For instance, an early integration
of mass production and distribution was the strategy of the Matsushita electric company,
which was founded in 1918. However, this was an exception rather than the rule.
An extension of the focal factories is found in sub-contracting and out-sourcing. Parent or
generally larger companies have established with suppliers or generally smaller firms two
types of sub-contracting, the informal one according to which written contracts are non-
existent, and the formal one. A set of ‘shared network norms’ was established over time
in the former one and a trusting relationship developed. In addition, there was a
continuous transfer of organisational and technological innovations from the big kaisha
firms to the smaller ones, though the latter did not benefit in every respect from this
cooperation (for instance not in terms of wages).
Within the sub-contracting system, special emphasis must be given to the component
design, which depending on the relative independence of the smaller firms, maximised
technological innovations. Following M. Best’s analysis (1990, p. 164), there are three
types of component design relationship between automakers and parts makers:
1. “…The automaker provides blueprint specifications to a range of potential part
makers, each of whom submits a price bid.
2. “…The automaker supplies blueprint specifications but expects the parts maker
to suggest alterations in the development process.
3. “…The automaker does not provide blueprint specifications but only
component performance requirements. Here the parts maker is expected to
have an independent design capacity and be able to solve problems jointly with
the automaker…”.
The second and third types of supplier relations are much more networked than the first
one and are more of a Japanese organisational innovation which has been successful in
promoting new technologies combined with high quality. This innovation has gradually
penetrated other industries as well. As Whittaker (1994) tells us, in 1987, 55.9% of SMEs
did some form of sub-contracting, though at a decreasing rate from 1981.
After WWII, the complicated system of Japanese firm networks between zaibatsus, or
between the latter and non-zaibatsus was replaced only in name by the even more
intensified network of keiretsus and non-keiretsus. Overall, by and large, the system has
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not changed much: a huge number of establishments, especially small ones still exist and
survived despite the recent long lasted recession, all of them intertwined with each other
in a cooperative way.
Furthermore, after WWII, the Japanese large firms, such as Toyota, introduced a few
unique organisational innovations. These were the Just-In-Time (JIT) production and
inventory process, the automated and flexible manufacturing system (AFMS), the
adaptable product development (APD), the process efficiency, the extended quality
control and so on (see for instance, Best (1990),  Abegglen and Stalk (1985), McMillan
(1984),  etc). All these innovations reinforced the dual cooperative system of keiretsus
and big firms cum SMEs.
Indeed, Western researchers about the Japanese economic miracle from 1950 to 1990
have repeatedly observed that there is cooperation in all levels of Japan’s society, for
instance between workers and managers, between government agencies and firms etc.
“…Japan’s physical and geographical characteristics give social reinforcement to its
social history of groupism, interdependence, and sense of ON and GIRI- debt and
obligation…” (C. J. McMillan, 1984, p. 23).
B  The American firm evolution.
a-The start of the big business, external and internal organisation: towards the Second
Industrial Revolution
The development of the railways system coincided with the USA' s economic industrial
take-off period of the mid 19th century. The most important achievement in the railways
development was the appearance, for the first time in economic history, of the modern big
business based on salaried managers to run multimillion railway firms across the country
(Chandler, 1977). These firms will influence in the decades up to the end of the 19th century
many other enterprises in different industries in terms of their organisation and management
techniques. Famous entrepreneurs who played a marked role in innovating in their own
business originally were trained in the railways firms.
Together with the development of a national network of rails, there was a parallel
development in telegraph, steamships and cable systems which all allowed for the first time
in history a speedy and voluminous dispatch of various products in all parts of the vast
country. This in turn paved the way for huge economies of scale and scope in existing and
new industries during the second half of the 19th century.
Besides the railways expansion, another precondition for the second industrial revolution
was the superabundance of land, combined with a favourable inclination for
entrepreneurship (Americans were always fascinated by the success of their business
people), and a shortage of labour (McCraw, 1997; Habakkuk, 1962).
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Big business through mass production began to gather steam in the 1870s and 1880s. Out of
the Fortune 500 largest American firms in the mid 1990s, 53 were founded in the 1880s (eg
Kodak, Johnson & Johnson, Coca-Cola, Westinghouse Electric), 39 in the 1890s (eg
General Electric, Pepsico, Goodyear ), 52 in 1900s (eg Ford Motor, Gillette, General
Motors) (the source of this count is Harris Corporation, 1996).
In the 1880s and early 1890s, many small manufacturers in the sugar, leather, salt, distilling,
linseed and cotton oil, biscuit, petroleum, fertiliser and rubber boot and glove industries,
joined into forming large horizontal combinations. The latter resulted mainly as a response
to overproduction by numerous small firms in an expanding national market during the
1860s and 1870s and hence a threatening situation of prices falling below production costs
(Chandler, 1959, p. 10). The producer goods industries developed later. Until the depression
of the 1890s, most of the combinations and consolidations had been in the consumers' goods
industries.
The American economy was consolidated and strengthened during the period 1890 to 1910
approximately (the core of the Second industrial Revolution). This consolidation took place
through the process of:
* Full integration of mass production and mass marketing (Chandler's thesis)
for both the consumer goods and producer goods industries.
   * Multi-functional hierarchical business organisation (to some extent similar to
that of the railways firms).
* A marked change in the organisation of shop floor (Lazonick's thesis, 1990).
* Appearance of big national and international corporations.
* Salaried managers took over in running big business from the founding
entrepreneurs in an increasing way.
* Middle management and especially top management for the first time
replaced market forces in an oligopolistic environment.
* The learned skills and knowledge within each oligopolistic market were
company-specific and industry-specific.
Combinations and integrations in the consumers' goods industries before 1897 had almost
entirely been engineered and financed by the entrepreneurs themselves. On the contrary,
after 1897, when the biggest merger movement in the American economic history took
place, outside funds played an increasingly significant role in industrial combination and
integration. Financiers and promoters began to acquire the same type of control over
industrial corporations as they did earlier in the 1850s over railroad firms.
Like the companies making consumers' goods, those making producers' goods also set up
nation-wide and world-wide marketing and distributing organisations, consolidated
production into a few large plants and established purchasing departments. Also, except in
steel, integration usually followed combination in the producers' goods industries.
8
Such large enterprises often led to diversification of the types of products these
manufacturing companies made and sold. The 'full line' strategy, pioneered by General
Electric and Westinghouse, was soon adopted by many other consolidated concerns.
Large industrial firms became by the turn of this century, vertically integrated, forward into
distribution and backward into supplies of inputs, also centralised and functionally
departmentalised organisations. They became increasingly bureaucratic internally and
oligopolistic externally, despite some tendencies for monopolies. Integration and
combination by one manufacturer forced others to follow.
Still following Chandler’s analysis, further reorganisation of firms took place, this time
internal in nature. The coordination and control of the flow of materials at a high volume
and speed through many departments in which many workers were employed in each of the
production processes created most challenging administrative and managerial problems in
the second half of the 19th century. These problems became acute only in the late 1870s and
1880s but their solutions started taking place in the 1890s and 1900s.
In the years of expansion of 1870s and 1880s, industrialists relied on skilled foremen to
recruit, train and manage the workers. That was the 'inside contracting' system of labour
organisation, through which the owners eventually lost control over costs and the
coordination of the flow of goods through the many departments.
H. C. Metcalfe, in 1885, prescribed a solution to the 'inside contracting' system. His solution
was an adaptation of the voucher system of accounts developed in railroad repair shops to
the needs of interchangeable-parts manufacturing. H. A. Towne, F. A. Halsey, and other
metalworking manufacturers subsequently developed the 'gain-sharing' system. However, a
further suggestion came from F. W. Taylor, who, in 1895, pronounced his 'scientific
management', according to which standards of premiums and bonuses paid should be
determined 'scientifically' and not historically. American manufacturers rarely adopted
Taylor's full system. Instead, they gradually, from the mid 1890s to the end of 1900s
adopted and refined the line-and-staff organisation which originally was invented by
railroad men in the 1850s.
There is another way of looking into these organisational innovations, which were directly
linked to the relation between workers on the shop floor and management of the production
processes. Skilled workers who played a central role in shop floor operations were
transformed into lower managers, thus a valuable cooperation was gained from these
transformed salaried employees. As Lazonick said: "...making skilled workers members of
the firm helped management to divide and conquer the labour force." (p. 229, Lazonick,
1990).
All these internal organisational reforms further strengthened the power of the larger firms,
which in turn accelerated their growth and at the same time the growth of the USA. As
Chandler says “...Kuznets data support the assertion that the industries spearheading
American economic growth were those dominated by a small number of large managerial
enterprises...” (p. 226, Chandler, 1990).
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b- Diversification of production and reinforcement of big business. Reversal of the
trend from the 1980s.
The interwar period was very turbulent with major recessions and booms, which
eventually consolidated the structure of the American economy as this was shaped before
WW1. The USA were already dominating the world economy before the break of the
World War II. When the latter ended, the American economy was even stronger and
totally in control of the non-communist globe.  It was not though until the late 1960s and
especially the 1970s that the European and Japanese nations started threatening this
American supremacy.
How did these managers respond to the then developing fierce competition? Chandler,
and other researchers have suggested that the American firms decided to expand through
the process of diversification either to a minor extent to related industries or, to a major
extent, for the first time, to unrelated ones. The diversification into unrelated industries
led to the emergence of many conglomerates, an innovation of the 1960s for the
Americans (Chandler & Tedlow, 1985, p. 739). This trend was reversed later in the
1980s, when consolidation and specialisation took place again (Shleifer’s & Vishny’s
(1994)).
In short, the American managers, via the third most important merger movement in the
their history, have chosen in the 1960s an easy way of making some extra profits, or at
least conserving the existing ones, but they did not lower unit costs of various products
via economies of scale, as they have so successfully done during the Second Industrial
Revolution.
In addition, diversification and multi-divisionalisation went hand in hand. The continuous
process of vertical and horizontal integration as well as the product extension into
additional industries during more than a 100 years of American economic development
has ended up in more and more multi-divisionalisation, hence the proliferation of the M-
form of American firms.
Finally, the propagation of American transnational firms (TNCs) in the world economy,
their spreading-out in many nations and sectors through their tool of ‘visible hand’ (eg
transfer prices) certainly makes it possible to make the contention that the supremacy of
the American TNCs further solidified the big business trend of the American firm
evolution.
However, a reversal towards smaller firms and an increase in the total number of business
concerns started in the 1980s or even earlier (see for instance table 1.3b of the 1997
OECD report, or Harrison, 1994). This reversal can be described as follows.
The new information technology introduced in the 1950s, expanded in the 1960s really
took off in the 1970s. It allowed the appearance of flexible and programmable machines,
which can be used not just for one task but for a whole set of tasks. These machines can
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extend Tayloristic organisation of labour from mass production to the production of small
lots and even single products. Consequently, “…Corporations would be run as networks
of establishments often considerably smaller than the classical Fordist factory. Also many
forms of subcontracting, franchising and the like are used to a considerable extent to
create formally independent units well integrated in such networks…”( H. Ernste & C.
Jaeger, 1989, p. 173).
P. Dicken (1986, 1992), and others also confirm this conclusion. For instance, A.
Chandler (1990, p. 607) says that “…In the 1960s and 1970s a wide variety of industries
shifted from electromechanical to electronically controlled processes of production that
began to transform the work place and alter the materials used in production. They
realigned the economies of scale and scope, often reducing minimum efficient scale and
at the same time expanding the opportunities for exploiting the economies of scope…”.
The system of flexible specialisation can be defined in broad terms as a vertical
disintegration of some core industries or as “…the establishment of a much more
independent network of small plants based on a work organisation which as a
complement to flexibility and specialisation explicitly emphasises professionalisation…”
(H. Ernste & C. Jaeger, 1989, p. 176).
B. Harrison (1994) has argued for similar points in his attempt to explain “the changing
landscape of corporate power in the age of flexibility” in the USA. For instance he
mentions vertical disintegration, and strategic downsizing of large conglomerates in order
to capture the power of core competencies, as being two main factors for the proliferation
of smaller firms.
C Comparison between the Japanese and the American evolutions
of firms. Comparison with other countries. Relation with
economic growth and competition.
From the very brief historical trip to Japan and the USA some conclusions can now be
readily made.
In Japan, smaller and more numerous firms has been the trend from the beginning of the
country’s industrialisation process. This was due to the early development of the focal
type of company, because of limited resources and technology, hence the search for
cooperation and consequently economies of scope to the detriment of economies of scale.
On the contrary, in the USA, we have seen the contrary evolution to take place, that is a
tendency from the beginning of the country’s industrialisation process for the creation of
big business, diversification of products, and eventually multi-divisional organisation.
This was due to a natural abundance of resources, human and non-human, plus a series of
major and minor technological and organisational breakthroughs. This divergent
historical evolution of the firm in the two countries Japan and the USA demonstrates that
there is not a unique way to evaluate competition and the role of SMEs, but this
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evaluation depends on the historical context of factors such as availability of resources,
technology, and organisation . In other words what is good for the USA might not be
good for Japan, or what is good for Japan might not be good for Canada, and so on.
Also, in Japan, many organisational innovations such as AFMS, JIT, APD, (see section
A) and the Japanese style sub-contracting enhanced and sustained the development of
SMEs. On the contrary, in the USA, only very recently, from the late 1980s, there has
been a reversal in the continuous expansion of big business to the detriment of smaller
ones. This is very probably explained by the reorganisation of the American firms to take
into account the immense possibilities offered by the huge development of information
technology, such as Internet and powerful individual computers. Otherwise, no major
organisational innovation took place in this country after WWII except an intensification
of product diversification and multi-divisionalism.
In Japan, the conglomerate type of business existed from the start of the country’s
industrialisation process and has continued its development up to these days. On the
contrary, in the USA it only appeared in the mid 1960s, but its development was reversed
in the 1980s. Again, this antithesis between the Japanese and the American firm
evolutions can be explained by differences in resource and technological endowments as
well as historical circumstances.
An important conclusion is that in Japan, we have a more competitive economic
environment than in the USA. Here, a stronger competition means that a buyer has a
larger choice of suppliers or sellers in the economy. This can be verified mainly by
considering the number of firms operating in each industry and in total. Table 1 in
Appendix 1 shows this number for 16 OECD countries. In each of the industries
examined, the Japanese competition is stronger than in any other country (though the data
used are not consistent across countries, the comparison is revealing). On the contrary,
the American industries are not as competitive, they often tend to be more oligopolistic.
M. Porter (1990) has also analysed the degree of competitiveness in several countries,
such as Japan and the USA,  when he talked about “domestic rivalry”. However, he
seems to indicate that an oligopolistic competition is desirable, at least as an alternative to
monopolies and oligopolies with only few rivals. My argument is rather based on the
relative importance of SMEs which offer a more intensive competition than just a larger
number of oligopolistic firms. Further evidence that Japan offers a very strong
competitive environment, even in the sub-contracting sector, is provided by many other
researchers such as Y. Miwa (1994), M. Ito (1994), Y. Watanabe (1997), T. Fujimoto and
A. Takeishi (1997).
As a consequence of all the analysis so far, I will propose the following theoretical model
in order to explain differences in economic growth between the advanced nations. The
following schema shows the main points.
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Briefly, the above schema tells the following story. First, the poorer the country is the
lower the average income and the more unsatisfied the demand for all goods is, which in
turn generates more growth if the remaining conditions are met. This is a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for high economic growth. This is another way of expressing
the controversial convergence theory of growth (for the latter see for example Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995), or C. I. Jones (1998) for a comprehensive review). The application
of this condition to the two economies under study clearly shows that Japan’s lateness of
economic development when translated into substantial unsatisfied demand created a
solid basis for higher economic growth than in the USA for most of the periods of the last
century.
Second, another necessary but not sufficient condition for high economic growth is a
continuous flow of minor and major managerial and technological innovations. This took
place in both Japan and the USA, though in different ways, in different periods and in
different intensities, as sections A and B have demonstrated.
Third, another necessary and perhaps sufficient condition for high economic growth is
competition and rivalry amongst domestic firms in all industries. Such competition,
especially if accompanied by some cooperation and networking enhances not so much
economies of scale but economies of scope (not necessarily as joint production under the
same roof and firm but as joint production in separate establishments). In turn, strong
competition and economies of scope increase value added, which eventually leads to high
economic growth. The chance of a larger number of companies creating a larger value
added than a smaller number of enterprises is very high, since the various stages of
production are increased with a larger number of firms. In other words horizontal and
especially vertical integration reduces the value added for a given product, especially in
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heavy manufacturing industries, such as cars. In addition, strong competition and a large
number of production establishments are also closely related to the system of sub-
contracting.
How is this third condition translated in the two countries? In the USA, the tendency for
big business, vertical integration, mass production, formation of oligopolies and a limited
number of firms has meant a slower economic growth than in Japan (ceteris paribus)
over most of the last century. The contrary is true for the Asian country. However, I
should add that not all the Japanese industries are exposed to domestic and international
competition, contrary to the American entire set of industries, which have been exposed
to at least international competition for a long time. This two-faced Japanese competition
is perhaps the deep reason for the recent prolonged recession in the Asian country.
Fourth, economic growth and industrial organisation depend on the scarcity or abundance
of resources and markets. Thus, Japan with a relatively limited amount of resources,
technology and markets in the beginning of its economic development adopted a different
mode of economic organisation than the USA with its renowned richness in all these
factors. This point of the relative abundance of resources will be taken up again at the end
of this section.
According to the above conclusions, I will attempt now to separate the OECD (as of the
year 1990) plus the East Asian countries (these two different groups constitute perhaps
the most advanced economies in the world today) in two camps. In the Japanese camp, I
will include all the East Asian countries, plus the poorest of the OECD ones, namely,
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, plus Italy with its rich North and poor South. In this
camp, the general characteristic is a dual system of some big companies with a big army
of SMEs, which propel their economies in a dynamic way. Also, in this camp, there is a
relative scarcity of natural resources, late development, and a reliance on technological
imitation. Finally, perhaps as a consequence of all these traits, these countries were the
fastest growing economies in the world (with minor exceptions) in the last 30 to 50 years
(see the quantitative analysis in the next section).
In the American camp, I am attempted to include Canada, Australia, New Zealand, plus
all the Northern European countries, plus France. In this camp, the general characteristics
are virtually the contrary of the Japanese camp, that is a proliferation of big business, a
long history of independent economic and technological development, and a slower
economic growth during the last 30 to 50 years.
As a confirmation of my choices, I will briefly give some elements for two countries in
terms of their firm evolution, namely Italy (of the Japanese camp) and Germany (of the
American camp). Comparison with other countries will be made in the next section in a
quantitative way.
Chandler (1990) has extensively examined some of the main aspects of the German
capitalism. “…The greatest difference, however, came in interfirm and intrafirm
relationships. Whereas in the United states the new, large, integrated managerial firms
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competed aggressively for market share and profits, in Germany many of them preferred
to cooperate…” (p. 395). Famous German large enterprises are particularly noticeable in
the chemical, electrical and mechanical industries, which directly compete with the
American giants.  Also, a more recent study by Schwalbach (1990) has concluded,
“…technological factors, like scale economies, limit the prosperity of small business. In
addition, industries with a high intensity of investments in advertising and R&D, and
large domestic and foreign output volumes are dominated by big business…”. The
quantitative model in the final section will support these remarks.
The Italian case is very similar to the Japanese one, in terms of firms’ networks and sub-
contracting. Best (1990) best describes it. “…An industrial district is like a collective
entrepreneur. In Brusco’s terms it combines productive decentralisation and social
integration…We can identify a large number of cooperative institutions within the third
Italy that serve as functional equivalents to managerial hierarchy…They are establishing
an alternative to the Japanese institutional complex as a form of the new
Competition…(p. 207). The Italian decentralised and flexible production system has been
extensively analysed by others researchers as well (see for instance F. Pyke et al, 1990
for a good review). The Italian industrial districts are characterised by flexible
specialisation, (which is very different from the Fordist organisation), competition, and
cooperation (Pyke et al, 1990). I should also add, that In Italy as in Japan, the coexistence
between very large firms and a myriad of smaller companies creates a positive and
unique lever for economic growth.
I will supplement this section with an attempt to briefly explain the Japanese and
American firm evolutions by using the tool of linear programming (LP). The following
theoretical example of LP will serve to illustrate some of the main issues I discussed
above.
Suppose that we have two firms, one in the USA and one in Japan, facing the usual
simple LP problem of maximising profits subject to some constraints. Without disclosing
as yet which LP problem belongs to which country, I will formulate the two models first.
LP1: max Z= ax + by + cz + dw
Subject to: a11 x + a12 y +a13 z +a14 w <= M1
a21 x + a22 y +a23 z +a24 w <= M2
a31 x + a32 y +a33 z +a34 w <= M3
 a41 x + a42 y +a43 z +a44 w <= M4
a51 x + a52 y +a53 z +a54 w <= M5
a61 x + a62 y +a63 z +a64 w <= M6
LP2: max Z= ax + by + cz + dw
Subject to: a11 x + a12 y +a13 z +a14 w <= M1
a21 x + a22 y +a23 z +a24 w <= M2
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Z is the objective function to be maximised, x, y, z, and w are the 4 products to be
produced, a, b, c, and d are the profit per unit for each product, aij  are the substitution
coefficients, and M1  to M6 are the technological, human, and organisational constraints,
such as machines, tools, skilled labour, and so on.
Furthermore, the firm in LP1 has the intention to produce four products by using six
different types of technological, human, and organisational inputs or constraints, as all
these inputs are readily available. On the other hand, the firm in LP2 also has the
intention to produce the same four products, but its resources are limited to only two
types of inputs (namely M1 and M2).
According to the rules of the LP formulation, the firm in LP1 has two possibilities, either
to produce the four products considered x, y, z, and w, or to increase its production to six
products, say through vertical integration. On the contrary, the firm in LP2 has only one
limited possibility, that is, to produce only two products amongst the four (the precise
combination will be suggested by the solution of the LP2 problem).
By now, it has become apparent that the firm in LP1 is an American firm with its larger
choice of inputs, whereas the firm in LP2 must be somewhere in Japan. It would be
possible to extend this LP formulation in order to include differences in demand and
networking, but I will leave this as an exercise in another paper. Also, the programming
does not have to be linear in order to demonstrate the relevant issues, but it makes
explanations easier.
As an important confirming conclusion drawn from this LP exercise, I can readily say
that the Japanese evolution of the firm has been influenced by the limited resources,
(technological, human, and organisational), from the beginning of its industrial
development a century ago, and consequently, it still depends on the myriad of smaller
firms for a strong economic growth. On the contrary, the American firm has evolved
from the beginning of its industrial take-off as a big business and relies much less on the
peripheral smaller firms, because resources have always been relatively abundant in the
USA.
D Quantitative evidence of the relationship between the number of
firms (as a proxy for competition) and economic growth
According to the previous three sections, I will now propose the following simple but
robust cross-country linear regression model in order to give some quantitative evidence
to my arguments. The 14 EU countries (thus excluding Luxembourg), plus Norway, plus
Japan, the USA, Australia, Canada, and Switzerland are included in the sample of the 20
most developed nations. Smaller countries like New Zealand, and Iceland were excluded.
RG = CONSTANT + a * Y60 + b * (TOEST/POP)*EMP99 + c * PAT + d* EXDIV +
+e* HUCAP +f* INCTAX + g* AGRSEC + error (1)
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RG stands for average annual growth rate of GDP per worker from 1960 to 1990 as a
percentage, and is explained by the following factors (see Appendix 2 for actual data).
Y60 stands for GDP per worker relative to the USA in 1960 (the original data are divided
by 1000), and represents the convergence variable mentioned in the previous section. The
lower this variable is, the higher the RG becomes.
TOEST indicates the number of total establishments (all sectors) in 1990, and represents
the competition influence, as well as the organisational structure of industries (for
instance, the small focal firms of Japan and the larger more diversified firms of the USA).
TOEST is further emphasised by the contribution of the small business sector as
represented by the variable EMP99, which indicates the percentage of employment of up
to 99 employees in that sector. TOEST is multiplied by EMP99 so that both of them
together further stress the contribution of small business to the overall competition. POP
stands for population in 1990 and is used to standardise the TOEST as a per capita
variable. The regression variable (TOEST/POP)*EMP99 is divided by 1000. The higher
this variable is, the higher the RG becomes.
PAT is the average annual number of patents granted to residents per 100000 inhabitants
during 1987 to 1990, and it is a proxy for the technological innovations taking place in
each country. Thus we see, that Japan is the champion in this respect followed further
down in the ladder by Germany and the USA. The higher this variable is, the higher the
RG becomes. EXPDIV is the percentage of export market value dominated by the top 3
destination countries in 1988, and is a proxy for the close integration of each country
within a particular region, eg Canada is heavily trading with the USA. The higher this
variable is, the higher the RG becomes.
HUCAP represents the human capital factor and is approximated by the multiplicative
effect of two variables, the HIGEDUC and the SECEDUC. The HIDEDUC is the
percentage of relevant age group receiving full-time secondary education in 1988 and the
SECEDUC is the fraction of 20-24 year-old population enrolled in higher education also
in 1988. These two variables are put together as HIGEDUC* SECEDUC3 (SECEDUC is
raised to the power 3 to emphasise the differences in secondary education, though this
does not significantly alter the results). Thus, we see, that the UK is lacking behind most
of the other countries in this respect. The higher this variable is, the higher the RG
becomes.
INCTAX is the personal income tax (on profits, income and capital gains) as a
percentage of GDP in 1989, and is a proxy of the government intervention in national
economies. Thus, Denmark is the champion in this respect followed by Sweden etc. The
higher this variable is, the lower the RG becomes. Finally, AGRSEC is the percentage of
total employment in the primary sector in 1991. Thus, Greece still employs a quarter of
its workforce in agriculture, followed by Portugal, Ireland and Spain. The higher this
variable is, the lower the RG becomes.
The OLS regression on equation (1) above gave the following very encouraging results.
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RG =   4.3  –42.2* Y60 + 0.19 * (TOEST/POP)*EMP99 + 0.012 * PAT +
(0%)    (0%)       (0.3%)   (2.0%)
0.009*EXDIV + 0.01 * HUCAP – 0.03* INCTAX –0.03* AGRSEC (2)
(13.4%)    (4.5%)          (1.6%)                  (9.1%)
R2 = 0.973; SEE= 0.21.
The figures in brackets under the coefficients denote P-values. Only the variables EXDIV
and AGRSEC are not significantly different from zero at the 5% (13.4% and 9.1%
respectively). Furthermore, all coefficients have the right signs. There is no apparent
concern for multi-collinearity.
The interpretation of these results can also be seen if we calculate each variable’s
contribution to the RG. Thus, regarding the variable Y60, if a country such as Japan
started in 1960 with a low GDP per worker of 20% as against 100% for the USA, then
the average constant RG of 4.3 (the constant of the regression) is only reduced by 0.84
for Japan and by 4.22 for the USA during the period 1960 to 1990. Regarding the
contribution of the variable representing competition, that is (TOEST/POP)*EMP99, a
country like Japan with a high value of this variable will benefit by an extra 0.81 of 1%
of growth, as against 0.26 for the USA.
Regarding the variable PAT (patents), the proxy for technological innovations, the extra
growth for Japan is 0.52 as against 0.23 for the USA. The human capital variable
HUCAP contributes to the growth of Japan by an extra 0.26 and to that of the USA by an
extra 0.56 of 1% growth. Note, that all these contributions to annual growth not only for
Japan and the USA, but also for every other country in the sample, are comparative
contributions, that is due to comparing each nation against the others. However, within
each country’ s economic growth, the constant 4.3% indicates the growth generated by
each country’s common technological and organisational advancements, investments and
so on (common to all nations).
Finally, a brief examination of the residuals (see Appendix 2) shows that overall the
errors are very small and most probably are due to errors in data.
What are the main conclusions of this quantitative analysis? First, in relation to the topic
of this paper, the econometric model shows that competition and SMEs play a clear and
decisive role in economic growth. This model shows that even when we take into account
some of the fundamental factors in determining economic growth such as unsatisfied
demand, technological innovations, and human capital, then competition and the number
of SMEs still have an important role to play. At the same time, as the number of SMEs is
also a proxy for the organisational structure of firms, the regression confirms my
contention that historical differences in company organization (eg small focal firms in
Japan as against larger diversified firms in the USA) make significant differences in
contributions in economic growth.
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Second, the convergence factor or unsatisfied demand seems to play a preponderant role
in determining economic growth, thus reaffirming similar conclusions of relevant
literature (see for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), or C. I. Jones (1998) for a
comprehensive review).
Third, if the estimated constant of regression (2) is further examined, an interesting
concept emerges. If all the 7 explanatory variables are negligible, then the average
growth rate is about 4.3% per annum. If the convergence factor is expressed as 50% of
the GDP per capita level of the USA in 1960, and all other factors are virtually zero, then
the average growth rate is about 2.2% per annum. I propose to call these various levels of
growth rates thus determined the “intrinsic” or “auto-sustained” rates of growth. For
example, if the convergence factor is expressed as about 100% of the GDP per capita
level of the USA in 1960, and all other variables of regression (2) are virtually zero, then
the “intrinsic” rate of growth is about 0% per annum. This also means that unless the
other variables such as competitive forces, technological cum organisational innovations,
and human capital increase, economic growth per capita will tend to go to zero.
Consequently, as these variables in developed countries tend to be positive and
significant, economic growth per capita will not tend to go to zero, thus supporting the
endogenous type of economic growth.
Fourth, it is worthwhile noting what the reasons have been for a positive growth rate in
the USA in the last 30 to 40 years. Since, the initial conditions of economic development
were 100% for that country in 1960 (the value of Y60), the average growth rate would
have been zero if the other variables of the model were not positive. Thus, the American
economy grew at an average of 1.4% from 1960 to 1990, because of improvements in
human capital (about 0.56%), because of the competitive factor (about 0.26%), because
of technological advancements (0.23%) (the remaining variables cancelling out).
E SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
From the literature point of view, this paper, in some ways, examines and contrasts two
Chandlerian analyses of firm evolution and subsequent growth, namely one suggested by
Chandler’s monumental work, and the other by Fruin’s less voluminous but enlightening
work. I hope to have added some further light as to why the two largest economies of the
world, the USA and Japan, differ in terms of their organisational structures, and economic
growth. My attempt consisted of comparing Chandler’s and Fruin’s analyses both
qualitatively and quantitatively, and in the context of other scholars’ work. The following
partial conclusions can only be part of the more general historical context in which
societies and economies evolve.
The first two sections have provided some qualitative evidence about three fundamental
differences between the two firm evolutions, namely the American and the Japanese ones
(the discussion on these differences took place in the third section). First, from the
beginning, Americans opted for the ‘big business’ organisation and continued to do so
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during the last century, contrary to the Japanese entrepreneurs who opted for the smaller
or focal firms. Second, the American companies have been very often industrially
organised as monopolies or oligopolies, and with a tendency for a centralised type of
management or multidivisional. Whereas the Japanese firms have been a mixture of a
handful of conglomerates with an army of SMEs with them, and a tendency for a
decentralised type of management or more functional than multidivisional. Third, the
Americans have opted for a production of diversified related products, whereas the
Japanese opted for a small range of products, that is for specialisation and sub-
contracting. Explanations as to why Japanese firms evolved differently from the
American ones included differences in natural resources and technology, which were
examined under the light of (linear) programming models. Other explanations (see
section B) were a consequence of historical circumstances.
The third section has related the two firm evolutions to economic growth and
competition. Two main conclusions are worth mentioning here. First, the particular firm
evolution in Japan and its consequential organisational features has lead to a very high
economic growth, substantially higher than that of the American economy. The
econometric cross-country model of the fourth section has carefully shown that countries
such as Japan and Italy have experienced higher growth rates than the USA and Germany
because of stronger competition elements and more effectively organised firms,
approximated by the number of SMEs in each country (other reasons for higher economic
growth were also included in the analysis). Second, inter-firm economies of scope and
non-integration were a major moving force behind Japan’s higher economic performance,
contrary to the intra-firm economies of scale and scope and vertical integration of
American firms. To my opinion, these inter-firm economies of scope constitute the major
Japanese organisational innovation leading to higher economic growth rates. It is worth
repeating Fruin’s (1992, p. 157) conclusion again:
“…a strategy of maximising inter-firm economies of scope through group-driven
cooperative transactions made better sense than the pursuit of internal production
and allocative efficiencies through vertical integration and product
diversification…” .
Finally, from the fourth section, the econometric analysis shows that a higher economic
growth rate for a given country such as Japan and Italy, comes from the following four
main factors. First, from the convergence factor or unsatisfied demand, thus confirming
the relevant literature on the matter. Second, from technological innovations. Third, from
the degree of competition and organisational effectiveness as approximated by the
number of SMEs. And fourth, from the human capital factor. An interesting corollary of
this conclusion is that for the 20 most developed countries in the sample, if the
convergence factor is expressed as 100% of the GDP per capita level of the USA in 1960,
and all other factors are virtually zero, then the average growth rate is about 0% per
annum. Consequently, as these variables in developed countries tend to be positive and
significant, economic growth per capita will not tend to go to zero, thus supporting the
endogenous type of economic growth.
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APPENDIX 1: Table 1
Establishments* (in ,000) POP** Establishments per 100000 inhabitants
ISIC number "3810""3820""3830""3832""3840""3843" "3810""3820""3830""3832""3840""3843" average
Australia 4.3 2.4 0.9 0.0 1.4 0.9 15.8 27.2 15.2 5.7 0.2 8.5 5.6 10.4
Austria 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 7.6 10.5 9.2 5.9 0.6 1.4 0.9 4.8
Canada 3.7 4.3 1.3 0.6 1.4 0.8 25.2 14.7 17.1 5.2 2.3 5.6 3.0 8.0
Denmark 0.9 1.0 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 5.1 17.6 19.6 5.9 2.4 5.9 2.2 8.9
Finland 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 4.9 14.3 13.3 4.1 1.2 6.1 3.1 7.0
Germany*** 5.3 5.5 3.3 1.2 1.0 1.5 61.0 8.7 9.0 5.4 2.0 1.6 2.5 4.9
Greece 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.1 9.9 6.1 4.0 3.0 0.4 2.5 0.7 2.8
Ireland 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 3.5 17.1 8.6 7.1 3.4 3.4 2.2 7.0
Japan 50.7 46.5 34.0 16.0 14.7 10.6 120.8 42.0 38.5 28.1 13.2 12.2 8.8 23.8
Norway 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.1 4.2 19.0 14.3 6.2 2.3 11.2 2.1 9.2
Portugal 1.2 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 9.9 12.1 11.1 1.7 0.4 2.3 1.4 4.8
Spain 14.7 13.7 2.2 0.4 1.2 0.1 38.4 38.3 35.7 5.7 0.9 3.1 0.2 14.0
Sweden 1.6 1.2 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.3 8.4 19.0 14.3 4.8 1.1 5.6 3.1 8.0
Switzerland 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 6.5 16.9 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.5 0.5 3.2
UK 14.6 22.5 9.8 3.7 4.4 2.1 56.7 25.7 39.7 17.3 6.5 7.8 3.7 16.8
USA 35.9 53.1 16.6 8.5 11.6 6.6 238.5 15.1 22.3 7.0 3.6 4.9 2.8 9.2
*  For the year 1986, or if not available for the year 1987
**POP stands for population in millions
***For Germany, and for 3832, and 3843 the figures were guessed
Note: these numbers should be treated with caution, as they are not consistent in definitions and accuracy
ISIC code: "3810" metal products
"3820" machinery nec
"3830" electrical machinery
"3832" radio, television,telephones,records, etc
"3840" transportation equipment
"3843" motor vehicles
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APPENDIX2:
Table 2: Original data used in the
regression
 RG Error Y60 TOEST POP TOEST EMP99 PAT EXPDIV SECEDUCHIGEDUCHUCAP INCTAX AGRSEC
 %   in ,000 millions /POP %  %  % % % %
Australia 1.50.06 78 430 17 25.3 59 6.4 38 0.99 29 28.1 14.3 5.5
Austria 3 -0 44 180 7.7 23.4 50 17.3 53.3 0.8 31 15.9 10.2 7.9
Belgium 2.70.01 58 490 10 49.0 55 4.9 54.4 0.99 33 32.0 16.4 2.8
Canada 1.9-0.2 79 600 26.6 22.6 45 4.4 82.2 1.05 62 71.8 16.7 4.5
Denmark 1.8-0.2 60 170 5.1 33.3 64 5.9 38.8 1.07 31 38.0 29.4 5.5
Finland 2.90.05 47 110 5 22.0 61 15.9 41.5 1.08 40 50.4 19.2 8.5
France 2.7-0.1 55 1980 56.7 34.9 54 15.3 38.4 0.94 35 29.1 7.6 6.1
Germany 2.5-0.2 57 2290 62 36.9 46 28.1 31 0.94 32 26.6 12.3 3.3
Greece 4.1-0.3 21 690 10.1 68.3 81 4.8 47.8 0.95 28 24.0 6.1 25.3
Ireland 3.50.26 34 130 3.5 37.1 56 0.7 55.5 0.98 25 23.5 13.2 15
Italy 3.40.15 45 3920 56.7 69.1 73 0.3 43.3 0.76 26 11.4 14 8.5
Japan 5 0.15 20 7000 123.5 56.7 75 43.2 45.9 0.95 30 25.7 15.1 6.7
Netherlands2 -0 70 420 15 28.0 54 5.4 49.1 1.04 32 36.0 12.8 4.5
Norway 2.40.07 58 90 4.2 21.4 59 6.7 50.1 0.94 35 29.1 15 5.9
Portugal 4.10.16 20 600 9.8 61.2 65 0.2 45.2 0.59 18 3.7 9.2 17.8
Spain 3.90 34 2460 39 63.1 70 4.4 40.3 1.05 32 37.0 11.3 10.7
Sweden 1.60.03 71 170 8.6 19.8 63 22.9 33.2 0.9 31 22.6 23.3 3.2
Switzerland 1.6-0.1 82 150 6.7 22.4 67 40.4 38.9 1 25 25.0 12.7 5.5
UK 2 -0.3 60 2630 56.6 46.5 49 7.7 34.9 0.83 23 13.2 14.3 2.2
USA 1.40.36 100 6000 249.9 24.0 56 19.1 39.9 0.98 60 56.5 13 2.9
For the definition of variables see text, section D.
Sources:
The variables RG and Y60 were extracted from Table B.2 in C. I. Jones (1998).
The variables PAT, EXPDIV, SECEDUC, HIGEDUC, INCTAX , and AGRSEC are extracted from tables
7.25, 2.27, 8.11, 8.12, 3.29, and 8.30 respectively in IMD (1992). Note that for Switzerland, SECEDUC
was guessed to be 1. HUCAP is a derived variable (see section D).
The variable POP was taken from the OECD publication (1995).
For the variable TOEST and EMP99, various sources were used and some rather “harmless” estimations
were performed because the data in this domain are not very reliable nor consistent. As the authors of the
1997 OECD report on SMEs remarked “…The demand for reliable, relevant and internationally
comparable data on SMEs is on the rise…” (p. 3).
For the 11 EU countries of 1990, the table 2.8 of the ENSR (1994) report was used without any further calculations. For the three
EFTA countries Austria, Finland, and Sweden the corresponding figures were estimated from the information on pages 32-33, same
report (ENSR). For the countries Switzerland, Norway, and Canada the figures were estimated by using the sources of the OECD
report (1997) on SMEs, tables 1.1 to 1.6, the manufacturing relevant data from A. J. Darnay (1995), and the OECD (1996) report. For
Japan, the table 14-2, volume 4, of JSA, 1987, was used and the figures were extrapolated for 1990.  For the USA, table 873 of the
1991 national Data Book was utilised, and the figures were extrapolated for 1990. For Australia, various issues of the “Yearbook
Australia” were utilised and the appropriate figures were estimated.
Note that in the model presented in section D above, the estimated figures did not alter the significance of the results, mainly because
the data for the main countries such as Japan, the USA, Italy etc are relatively accurate. Also, small changes in these estimated figures
do not alter the regression results significantly.
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